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Competitions in different banking markets and shadow banking: evidence from China
Abstract
Purpose- This study investigates the inter-relationships between competitions in different banking 
markets and shadow banking for the Chinese banking industry over the period 2003-2017. The 
current study also examines the determinants of competition in different banking markets and the 
factors influencing the size of shadow banking.
Design/methodology/approach- Bank competition is measured by Boone indicator, while the 
relationship between bank competition and shadow banking is examined through three-stage least 
Square estimator.
Findings- The findings suggest that a larger volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in the level 
of competition in the deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market, while an increase 
in the level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market leads 
to an expansion of shadow banking. We find that higher bank risk and higher developed of stock 
market reduce the competitive condition in the loan market, the competition in the deposit market 
will be enhanced by higher levels of banking sector development and higher levels of inflation, but 
bank diversification will reduce the level of competition in the deposit market. We further find that 
higher bank profitability and higher stock market development reduce bank competition in the non-
interest income market. Finally, the results show that larger bank size and higher development of 
stock market reduce the size of shadow banking in China, but higher economic growth increases the 
size of shadow banking.  
Originality- This is the first piece of research investigating the relationship between bank 
competition and shadow banking. This will also be the first piece of research examining the 
determinants of competition in different banking markets and also the factors influencing the size of 
shadowing banking in China.
Keywords: bank competition, shadow banking, China, Boone indicator
JEL classification: G21, C33
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The Chinese government has initiated several rounds of banking reforms since 1978. The main 
purpose of these banking reforms has been to increase competitive conditions, enhance stability and 
improve the performance of the Chinese banking sector (Tan, 2016a). With regards to the competitive 
condition in the Chinese banking industry, it is noticed that the state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs)1 still dominate the industry. However, according to statistics from the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the share of SOCB assets in total banking sector assets decreased 
between 2003 and 2017 to a low point of 36.77%. On the other hand, the joint-stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have kept increasing in size in a general trend and 
in 2017 they held 17.81% and 12.57% of total banking sector assets. Therefore, this statistic shows 
that the competitive condition is still quite low given that the five largest banks hold nearly 40% of 
total banking sector assets. Table 1 summarises the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking 
institutions in China over the period 2003-2017. 
<<Table 1---about here>>
The lower level of competition in the Chinese banking industry is not only represented by the 
concentration ratio in terms of total assets as illustrated before, this can also be reflected from different 
types of businesses engaged in by the Chinese commercial banks. In order to improve the competitive 
conditions in the deposit market and the loan market, the Central Bank of China (the Peoples’ Bank 
of China) had made efforts to liberalise the interest rate since 1996. From 20th July 2013 and 23rd 
October 2015, the loan interest rate, as well as the deposit interest rate in China, had been liberalized. 
The effectiveness of interest rate liberalisation, in other words, the impact of interest rate liberalisation 
on the competitive conditions in the deposit market, the loan market, as well as the non-interest 
income market in China, has been a concern for the Chinese government and banking regulatory 
authorities in China. Recently, the issue has been investigated by Tan (2017). The results of the 
research show that over the period 2003-2013, the non-interest income market has a higher level of 
competition compared to the deposit market and loan market in the Chinese banking industry.
Although the financial reform in China, as characterised by the interest rate liberalisation, is supposed 
to increase the competitive conditions in different banking markets in China, because of the specific 
and special characteristics of the Chinese banking industry, the banking sector still allocates the 
1 There are five state-owned commercial banks in China now, including Bank of China, Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of 
Communication. 
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credits (providing loan services) focusing on large or state-owned enterprises and the medium and 
small size enterprises find obtaining loans difficult, and thus, it is very difficult for them to be 
competitive and survive in the market (Elliott et al. (2015). This biased treatment to the micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises has a significant and negative impact on Chinese economic growth. 
Most of the funds for small and medium-sized enterprises are from shadow banking2. Table 2 shows 
the size and composition of China’s shadow banking over the period 2003-2017 (Elliot et al., 2015, 
CNBC and Bloomberg). The table shows that the shadow banking is becoming more and more 
important in China. 
<<Table 2---about here>>
Although there are few pieces of research studies investigating the relationship between shadow 
banking and interest rate liberalization in China (Wang et al., 2016; Hu, 2014), there is no study 
examining the inter-relationship between shadow banking and competition in different banking 
markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market) in China. Investigating this 
issue is very important from two different perspectives. First, the examination on the impact of 
competition in three different markets on shadow banking will provide more policy implications to 
the Chinese government and financial authorities in related to how to further solve the issue of 
difficulty for the small and medium sized enterprises to get funding, i.e. through further regulation 
on the environment for traditional banking businesses and non-traditional activities engaged in by the 
banks, the resulted influence on the growth of shadow banking can further increase the funding 
channels for the small and medium sized enterprises. Second, the investigation on the influence of 
shadow banking on competition in different banking markets can provide additional channel to adjust 
the level of competition in the banking market through better and proper regulation on the non-
banking financial market. On the one hand, the increase in the size of shadow banking takes away 
large amounts of loan businesses engaged in by the Chinese commercial banks, as the main source of 
bank income, this will increase the competition among Chinese commercial banks in the loan business. 
In addition, stronger competition in the loan market indicates that it is more difficult for the banks to 
grant credits to businesses. In order words, the volume of loan businesses engaged in by the Chinese 
commercial banks will be decreased, this further leads to a decline in the level of competition in the 
deposit market. Finally, a large amount of shadow banking not only takes away the loan business 
from commercial banks, but takes away the non-interest income generating business as well, this will 
lead to an increase in the level of competition among Chinese commercial banks in the non-interest 
income market. 
2 The Financial Stability Board (2013) defines shadow banking as credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the regular banking system. 
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On the other hand, lower level of competition in the loan market in the Chinese banking industry 
indicates that a large number of firms need the loans, this gives a big opportunity for the development 
of shadow banking in China. In other words, lower level of competition in the loan market leads to 
an increase in the size of shadow banking in China. In addition, increase in the level of competition 
in the deposit market in the Chinese banking industry reflects the fact that the Chinese commercial 
banks are short of funds to make loans, this will further lead to an expansion of shadow banking in 
China. Finally, lower level of competition in the non-interest income market in the Chinese banking 
industry indicates that Chinese commercial banks still focus on providing loan services to different 
enterprises, this is supposed to restrain the development of shadow banking in China. 
In summary, the current study fills the gaps in the empirical literature in the following three ways: 1) 
as the literature review section indicates, we will contribute to the existing studies by investigating 
the inter-relationships between competition in different banking markets and bank competition, this 
will be useful for the Chinese government and financial regulatory authority to regulate the shadow 
banking system through making relevant policies in the banking industry and also regulate the 
competition in different banking markets through making relevant policies to control the size of 
shadow banking； 2) as far as we are concerned, there has been no published empirical study 
examining the determinants of competition in different banking markets (loan market, deposit market 
and non-interest income market); we will investigate this issue in the current study; 3) besides the 
examination on the impact of competition on shadow banking as reflected from the first contribution, 
we will also investigate the factors that influence the size of shadow banking system in China. The 
latter two contributions are very useful for the government and financial regulatory authority to make 
specific policies to regulate either bank competition or/and shadow banking in China. 
The findings show that an increase in the volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in the 
competitive condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market, while the 
increase in the level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market 
leads to an increase in the volume of shadow banking in China. We find that higher bank risk and 
higher developed of stock market reduce the competitive condition in the loan market, the competition 
in the deposit market will be enhanced by higher levels of banking sector development and higher 
levels of inflation, but bank diversification will reduce the level of competition in the deposit market. 
We further find that higher bank profitability and higher stock market development reduce bank 
competition in the non-interest income market. Finally, the results show that larger bank size and 
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higher development of stock market reduce the size of shadow banking in China, but higher economic 
growth increases the size of shadow banking.  
This paper will be structured as follows: section 2 will review the empirical literature on bank 
competition, shadow banking and its relationships, which is followed by section 3, describing the 
data and methods. Section 4 reports the results, followed by discussing the robustness check in section 
5. Finally, section 6 provides a summary and conclusion of the whole paper. 
2. Literature review on bank competition 
2.1 Empirical literature on bank competition in China
There are a number of studies investigating the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking 
industry using different methods including Lerner index (Tan and Floros, 2013; Tan and Floros, 2014; 
Tan, 2016a; Tan et al., 2017; Tan and Anchor, 2017b; Tan and Floros, 2018a; Fungacova et al., 2013); 
Panzar-Rosse H statistic (Tan, 2014; Tan, 2016b); Efficiency-adjusted Lerner index (Tan and Anchor, 
2017a; Tan and Floros, 2018b), concentration ratio and Hirfindahl-Hirschmann index (Tan and Floros, 
2012b, Tan and Floros, 2012c; Tan, 2016, Tan, 2014)
Although the above-mentioned studies use different methods to estimate the level of competition in 
the Chinese banking industry, none of the above-mentioned methods evaluates the competitive 
conditions in different banking markets in China.
 
Tan (2017a) innovatively uses the Boone indicator to investigate the competitive conditions of 
different banking markets (deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market) in China 
over the period 2003-2009 and further tests the effects of competition and shadow banking on bank 
profitability in China. The results indicate that non-interest income market in the Chinese banking 
industry has a higher level of competition compared to deposit market and loan market, and a lower 
level of competition in the deposit market leads to an increase in the profitability of Chinese banks. 
Using the Boone indicator as the competition measurement, Tan (2017b) investigate the competitive 
condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market in the Chinese banking 
industry over the period 2003-2013 and further tests its inter-relationships with different types of risk 
(credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and insolvency) and different types of efficiency (cost 
efficiency, revenue efficiency and profit efficiency) of Chinese commercial banks under a three-stage 
least square estimation. The results indicate that higher level of competition leads to higher credit 
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risk, higher liquidity risk and higher capital risk, while a higher level of competition leads to lower 
level of efficiency of Chinese commercial banks. 
2.2 Literature review on shadow banking in China
Although data on shadow banking in China is available, the research in this topic has not received 
enough attention from academia and there are very limited research studies examining this important 
issue. Allen et al. (2019) collected the data from all public nonfinancial firms’ annual reports over the 
period 2004-2013 and had a close look at the largest component of shadow banking in China, which 
is entrusted loans. The performance of transaction level analysis shows that the level of interest rate 
charged by nonaffiliated loans is twice as high as the one offered by the official bank loan rate, while 
the level of interest rate charged by the affiliated loans is roughly the same as the one of the official 
bank loan rate. The findings further show that there is a level of difference between the nonaffiliated 
loans and the affiliated loans with nearly half of the former flow into real estate and construction and 
the latter are within-industry loans. Finally, the results report that although borrowers’ fundamental 
and information risks are the determinants of pricing of both these two types of loans, the risk is 
incorporated in the rate of nonaffiliated loans in a more efficient way.
Rather than looking at the specific component of Chinese shadow banking, Chen et al. (2018) 
examine the influence of monetary policy on Chinese shadow banking activities over the period 2009-
2015. The study contributes to the empirical literature by developing and estimating the endogenously 
switching monetary policy rule and the findings suggest that the shadow banking loans rise rapidly 
under the contractionary monetary policy, this increased in the volumes of shadow banking loans 
does not only offset the expected decline of the traditional banking loans, but reduce the level of 
effectiveness of monetary policy on banking credit allocation.
Different from the above two studies investigate the specific component of shadow banking and the 
relationship between monetary policy and shadow banking, Chen et al. (2020) investigate the impact 
of China’s stimulus package in 2009 on the growth of shadow banking. Therefore, this study 
differentiates itself from the previous two studies by analyzing the influence on the shadow banking 
activities from the local government perspectives. The findings suggest that the provinces with higher 
degrees of loan growth in 2009 not only experience an increase in the volumes of municipal bond 
issuance over the period 2012-2015, but also experience a boom in the level of shadow banking 
activities including trust loans and wealth management products. 
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2.3. the investigation on the relationship between shadow banking and bank competition
There are few pieces of research examining the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition. The studies focused on the issue both within the Chinese financial system as well as the 
one outside of China. Using the US data, Ann and Breton (2014) examine the impact of loan 
securitization on competition in the loan market.  This study suffers from the limitation that the 
shadow banking is represented by the securitization and the results cannot be generalized to the whole 
shadow banking markets, another limitation of the study lies to the fact that there is no explicit 
consideration on the level of competition in different banking markets. 
There are also few studies evaluating the relationship between shadow banking and bank competition 
in China. On top of Tan (2017) examining the shadow banking as well as its impact on bank 
profitability, Guo and Zhao (2017) used 16 Chinese commercial banks during 2008-2015 to assess 
the relationship between deposit competition and shadow banking. The study failed to identify the 
level of competition in another two important areas in banking operation which are competition in 
the loan market as well as competition in the non-interest income market, therefore, the study also 
missed the investigation on the inter-relationship between the competition in these different banking 
markets and bank competition. 
Instead of investigating the relationship between shadowing banking and deposit competition with a 
additional analysis of the intermediate role played by shadow banking in the influence of bank 
competition on risk-taking behavior, Zhou (2019) examined the relationship between bank 
competition and shadow banking using a sample of listed Chinese commercial banks over the period 
2007-2017. The study further evaluates the effect of shadow banking on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. This study suffers the same limitation as the one of Guo and Zhao (2017). 
In summary, through the review of empirical literature on investigating the competitive condition in 
the banking sector in China as well as the empirical research studies on the investig tion of shadow 
banking in China, it is noticed that there is no empirical research examining the relationship between 
bank competition and shadow banking. The current research fills in the gap of the empirical literature 
from this perspective. In addition, this will be the first piece of research examining the determinants 
of competition in different banking markets and also the factors influencing the size of shadowing 
banking in China.
Page 7 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem

































































3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Measurement of competitive condition in different banking markets in China—Boone 
indicator
As reviewed in the literature review section, Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H statistics are widely 
used in the empirical literature to estimate the level of competition in the banking industry. However, 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) argue that due to the fact that the Panzar-Rosse H statistics are developed 
based on the static model, there would be no prediction on the value and this indicator suffers from 
the limitation that it can not fulfil the overall market equilibrium requirement (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). The Lerner index is suffered from the limitation in terms of the difficulty to derive the marginal 
cost, because of different methods can be adopted to measure the marginal cost, therefore, the 
accuracy and robustness in related to the level of competition are affected (Fukuyama and Tan, 2020). 
Kwoka (1977) argue that the main limitation suffered by the Hirfindahl-Hirschman index is related 
to the fact that this indicator embodies both size inequality and firm numbers with weight, which are 
assumed a priori instead of being derived. Finally, Maksimović & Kostić (2012) argue that the 
concentration ratio suffers from the limitation of its inability to acknowledge market structure stability, 
level of product differentiation, entry barriers as well as operating cost.
 The current study uses the method proposed by Boone (2008) to measure the competition. The Bonne 
indicator holds the idea that the performance of efficient firms is improved and the performance of 
inefficient firms is weakened by competition. The basic logic of Boone indicator is in line with the 
argument of efficiency structure hypothesis, as developed by Demsetz (1973), which links the 
influence of efficiency on performance. The performance can be measured by profit or market share. 
A stronger effect will lead to a more negative Boone indicator. Although this indicator suffers from 
the same disadvantage as the Lerner index in terms of the estimation of marginal cost, this indicator 
is superior to other indicators for its ability to estimate competition in different banking markets and 
competition for different bank ownership types (Tan, 2018). The Boone indicator for bank i can be 
defined by the simplest equation as follows:
                                                                                  (1))()( kiki MCLNMSLN  
Where i represents the specific bank, k stands for a specific bank output, MS is the market share, 
while MC measures the marginal cost.   denotes the Boone indicator. In this paper, we focus on 
the analysis of competition in different markets, reflecting interest income activities as well as non-
interest generating businesses. Thus, K=loans, deposits, non-interest income. 
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The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with four outputs (total loans, 
total deposits, securities and non-interest income) and two input prices (price of labour, price of 































where C represents total cost of the bank, Y represents four outputs, including total deposits, total 
loans, non-interest income and securities, W stands for two input prices with W1 representing the 
price of funds, which is measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits, W2 represents 
the price of capital, which is measured by the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets. Two input 
prices are considered due to the fact that non-interest expenses include the labour cost as well (Hasan 
and Morton, 2003). In other words, the price of capital considers the factors relating to the price of 
physical capital as well as the price of human capital. The linear homogeneity is ensured by 
normalising the dependent variable and W1 by anther input price, W2.  The summary statistics of the 
variables are reported in Table 3. The statistics provided in Table 3 show that as compared to the 
price of funds, the Chinese commercial banks have a larger difference in the price of capital. This 
finding indicates that the Chinese commercial banks should place more emphasis on controlling the 
non-interest expenses. In addition, with regard to the banking outputs, the table suggests that Chinese 
commercial banks have the largest difference in generating the non-interest income, while they have 
the smallest difference in generating deposits. 
<<Table 3---about here>>
The marginal cost of loans can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the dependent variable in 
the above equation in relation to the output loans as follows:
















The marginal cost of deposit and non-interest income can be obtained similarly by taking the first 
derivative of the dependent variable in the above equation in relation to the outputs deposits and non-
interest income as below:
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3.2. Estimation on the inter-relationships between bank competition and shadow banking
We reply on the three-stage least square estimation to investigate the inter-relationships between bank 
competition and shadow banking as it takes account the endogeneity between bank competition and 
shadow banking in China
In order to disentangle the inter-relationships between bank competition and shadow banking, the 
following equations are estimated:
             (6)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
             (7)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡
                           (8)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+                               (9) itt Booneshadow 10  itSMD2 𝛾3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
Where t denotes the time dimension. BooneLoan represent the competitive condition in the loan 
market, BooneDeposit stands for the competitive condition in the deposit market, while BooneNII is 
the competitive condition in the non-interest income market, shadow represents the size of shadow 
banking in China. We control for different bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic 
variables which are supposed to have an influence on bank competition and shadow banking in China. 
The bank specific variables include bank profitability, measured by the net interest margin (ratio of 
net interest income to earning assets); bank risk, measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, bank diversification, measured by the ratio of non-interest income to gross revenue and 
bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.  The industry-specific variables are BSD 
and SMD, representing banking sector development and stock market development, respectively, 
while there are two macroeconomic variables considered in the current study which are INF (annual 
inflation rate) and GDPG (annual GDP growth rate). 
Page 10 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem

































































In order to use the three-stage least square estimator in the analysis, a set of unique variables are 
needed for a specific equation but not the other three. These instruments are supposed to be 
exogenous and do not correlate with the error term. We expect that the following variables only 
affect specific dependent variables, therefore, they only appear in one specific equation but not the 
other three.
Equation 6 only
Bank risk is used in this equation, it is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
We expect that higher levels of credit risk will induce the banks to be more cautions in making the 
credit allocation decisions, they will be more selective and raising the requirement on the loan 
applications made by different businesses, comparing to the scenario when there is a very low level 
of credit risk during which the banks would compete very strongly in the loan market, the higher 
levels of risk will reduce the level of competition in the loan market. 
Equation 7 only
Bank diversification is used in this equation, it is measured by the ratio of non-interest income to 
gross revenue. We argue that higher levels of diversification will reduce the reliance on the 
traditional deposit and loan businesses engaged in by the banks, more resources and efforts will be 
diverted to other businesses, this is supposed to reduce the level of competition in the deposit 
market.
Equation 8 only
Bank profitability is used in this equation. It is measured by the net interest margin (the ratio of net 
interest income to earning assets). The whole banking business can be generally divided into two 
parts, the traditional interest generating businesses as well as the non-traditional non-interest 
generating activities. Bank profitability, as measured by the net interest margin, reflect the level of 
profitability in the traditional interest generating businesses, a higher level of profitability indicates 
that banks would be able to get more profits from engaging in this specific activity, more resources 
will be allocated to this business area and this is supposed to lead to a decrease in the level of 
competition in the non-traditional non-interest generating businesses.
Equation 9 only
Bank size is used in this equation. It is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Large 
banks would be able to reduce the costs from economies of scale and economies of scope, the 
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reduction would be helpful to reduce the level of loan price. In other words, lower levels of cost 
derived from economies of scale and scope would expand the credits available from the traditional 
banking, this will also constraint the amount of credits from the shadow banking sector. 
We conduct the over-identification test and the test statistics show that the instruments used are 
valid. 
The competitive condition in different banking markets including deposit market, loan market and 
non-interest income market will be assessed through the Boone indicator as illustrated in the previous 
section, and the variables used to measure the Boone indicator is collected from Bankscope and 
fithconnect databases. The size of shadow banking will be measured by the volume of shadow 
banking. It is from Elliott et al. (2015), CNBC and Bloomberg.  With regard to the measurement of 
industry-specific variables, the banking sector development is measured by the ratio of total assets of 
the whole banking industry to GDP and stock market development is measured by the ratio of market 
capitalization of listed firms to GDP, the data is retrieved from China Banking Regulatory Authority 
and World Bank database, with regard to the data of macroeconomic variables, both annual inflation 
rate and GDP growth rate are obtained from the world bank database. The selection of the variables 
that have potential influence on the level of competition in different banking markets is in line with 
Tan (2017b). with regard to the selection of the controlled variables that have potential influence on 
shadow banking, we mainly have the following considerations: higher levels of stock market 
development will provide an additional channel for the small and medium sized enterprises to raise 
funding besides the traditional banking loans, this will also crowd out the role of shadow banking in 
the process of credit allocation and further reduce the size of shadow banking. In terms of inflation, 
we argue that higher levels of inflation result in a contraction of credits, this will include the traditional 
banking credits as well as the one provided in the shadow banking sector. Totally, we collect a 
balanced dataset of 30 Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003-2017 including 5 state-owned 
commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 13 city commercial banks. Table 4 provides 
the information with regard to the measurement of the variables, the source of data as well as the 
expected impact on shadow banking and competition in different banking markets. Table 5 present 
the descriptive statistics of the variables in the current study. It is noticed that the competition in 
different banking markets in China (deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market) 
over the examined period does not have too much difference, in comparison, it is found that the 
shadow banking and stock market development have a relatively large dispersion over the examined 
period. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Findings on the competitive conditions of different banking markets in China
Comparing the competitive conditions among the above three different banking markets, it was 
noticed that over the period 2006-2013, the competitive condition in these three different markets 
was the same. The main difference was noticed during the period 2003-2005 and 2014-2017. Figure 
1 shows that the competitive condition in the non-interest income market was the highest, in general, 
between 2003 and 2005, and between 2014 and 2017 compared to the other two markets, while the 
competitive condition in the loan market and the deposit market were the same over the same period. 
This finding is partly in line with Tan (2017).
<<Figure 1---about here>>
4.2. Findings on the inter-relationships between bank competition and shadow banking in 
China
Before proceeding to the econometric estimation on the inter-relationships between bank 
competition and shadow banking in China, the correlation between the variables has been tested to 
make sure that there is no multicollinearity issue. The results show that the correlation among 
variables is below 0.5, which indicates that the analysis does not suffer from any multicollinearity 
problem3. In order to test the inter-relationships between competition in different banking markets 
and shadow banking in an accurate way, we control for the individual bank effect as well as the time 
trend in the models. Most importantly, the results reported are adjusted by standard errors. Table 6 
shows the empirical results with regard to the inter-relationship between bank competition and size 
of shadow banking in China (when we focus on the impact of bank competition in the deposit market 
on shadow banking). The findings show that the size of shadow banking is significantly and 
negatively related to the competitive condition in the deposit market, loan market and non-interest 
income market in the Chinese banking industry, indicating that larger volume of shadow banking in 
China reduces the competitive condition among Chinese commercial banks. The significant and 
negative impact of shadow banking on the competitive condition in the deposit market is in line with 
our expectation as outline in the Introduction, while the impacts on competition in the loan market 
and the non-interest income market are in contrast with our expectation. The negative impact of 
3 The results with regard to the correlation is not provided in the text, however, it is available upon request from the 
corresponding author. 
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shadow banking on the level of competition in the loan market can be explained by the fact that 
medium and small size enterprises have a higher probability and larger opportunities to get funding 
from better development in the shadow banking, and the traditional banking industry mainly focuses 
on granting credits to relatively larger size enterprises, all the Chinese commercial banks have 
established stable relationship with relevant enterprises, in other words, each bank has its own 
customers in terms of credit allocation, this leads to a less competitive condition in the loan market. 
The same as the loan market, larger volume of shadow banking in China takes away larger amount 
of non-traditional banking businesses from the traditional banking sector, while Chinese commercial 
banks mainly engage in the non-interest income generating activities with its established customers, 
under this circumstance, the competitive condition is quite low in the non-interest income market. 
The findings further indicate that higher level of competition in the deposit market leads to an 
increase in the volume of shadow banking, this is in accordance with our expectation as discussed 
in the Introduction.
The results from the table further report that higher developed banking sector leads to a higher level 
of competition in the deposit market. This is due to the fact that higher developed banking sector 
indicates that there is a larger demand for banking services and in order to provide different types 
of services, the Chinese commercial banks need large a volume of funds, this fund is mainly from 
the deposit. In other words, the higher developed banking sector induce Chinese commercial banks 
to compete more in the deposit market in order to get ore funds. The results show that higher 
developed stock market leads to a reduction in the level of competition in the loan market and non-
interest income market in the Chinese banking industry, as reflected by the significant and positive 
signs of the variable. This finding can be explained by the fact that higher developed stock market 
provides an additional source of funding for different companies, the resulted reduction in the 
demand for loans from commercial banks decreases the price of loans, which further precede a 
decline in bank competition in this market. A higher developed stock market attracts more funds 
from the public and significantly reduces the volume of non-traditional business engaged in by the 
commercial banks, the resulted increase in the cost of engaging in the non-interest income activities 
reduces the incentive of commercial banks to engage in this activity and further leads to a decline in 
the competition in the non-interest income market. It is found that higher level of inflation leads to 
an increase in the level of bank competition in the deposit market. This can be explained by the fact 
that higher inflation reflects the fact that there is an excessive circulation with regard to the amount 
of currency in the market, rather than saving the money in the banks, people will normally prefer to 
spend the money in the money, this will lead to a situation that Chinese commercial banks are short 
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of funds to make loans. This will further lead to an increase in the level of competition in the deposit 
market. We also have the following results which are in line with our expectation: 1) higher levels 
of stock market development reduce the size of shadow banking; 2) higher bank risk reduces the 
level of competition in the loan market and higher profitability reduces the level of competition in 
the non-interest income market; 3) large bank size reduces the size of shadow banking; 4) GDP 
growth increases the size of shadow banking.
Table 7 and Table 8 test the impact of competition in the loan market on the size of shadow banking 
and the effect of competition in the non-interest income market on the size of shadow banking, 
respectively. The findings suggest that higher level of competition in the loan market leads to an 
expansion of shadow banking in China and also the size of shadowing banking will increase if the 
competitive condition in the non-interest income market in the Chinese banking industry improves. 
The impact of the level of competition in the non-interest income market on shadow banking is in 
accordance with our expectation in the introduction, however, the impact of competition in the loan 
market on shadow banking is different from our expectation. The significant and positive impact of 
competition in the loan market on shadow banking can be explained by the fact that higher level of 
competition in the loan market indicates that there are not too many companies seeking loans and 
probably that the country is slowing down the economic growth, under this period, the commercial 
banks will be very selective on the companies to which they grant credit due to the consideration 
that there would an increase in the non-performing loans in this period. This will make the medium 
and small size enterprises more difficult to obtain loans from commercial banks, therefore, this will 
lead to an expansion of shadow banking in China. Table 9 provides a summary of the significant 






In order to check the robustness of the results, the current study mainly focuses on the use of the 
following two ways: 1) instead of using the Boone indicator to measure the competitive condition 
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in the deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market in China, the current study uses 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure the competition in these three different markets; 2) in 
terms of the econometric techniques, the current study cross check the robustness of the results by 
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression rather than the three-stage Least square estimator. 
Through the use of the above two ways, the results show that the findings of our original estimation 
are robust due to the fact that the findings of these three different estimations are quantitatively 
similar4.
6. Summary and conclusion
Although the development of the banking industry plays an important part to the economic growth of 
a country and it is a traditional source of funding for different types of enterprises, it is still quite 
difficult for the medium and small size enterprises to get funding from the banking sector. This 
induces the small and medium-size enterprises to seek funding from the non-banking sector and 
further promote the development of the shadow banking industry in China. As the official statistics 
show that the shadow banking in China has undergone significant growth during recent years. What 
will be the impact of the development of shadow banking on the traditional banking sector and at the 
same time, what will be the influence of the traditional banking industry on the shadow banking 
industry? The answers to these questions will not only contribute to the empirical literature, but 
provide more policy implications to the Chinese government and regulatory authorities to further 
develop the traditional banking industry and the shadow banking industry. The current study 
contributes to the empirical banking literature by being the first piece of research investigating the 
inter-relationships between bank competition and shadow banking using a sample of Chinese 
commercial banks over the period 2003-2017 under a three-stage least square estimator. In addition, 
the current study fills in the gap of the empirical literature by investigating the determinants of 
competition in different banking markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income 
market) and also the factors influencing the size of shadow banking in China. 
The findings suggest that larger volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in competition in the 
loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market. The results further show that higher 
level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market results in an 
increase in the volume of shadow banking in China. We find that higher bank risk and higher 
developed of stock market reduce the competitive condition in the loan market,  while the competition 
in the deposit market will be enhanced by higher levels of banking sector development and higher 
4 The estimation results of the robustness check are not reported in the paper; however, they are available from 
request from the corresponding author. 
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levels of inflation, but bank diversification will reduce the level of competition in the deposit market. 
We further find that higher bank profitability and higher stock market development reduce bank 
competition in the non-interest income market. Finally, the results show that larger bank size and 
highe  development of stock market reduce the size of shadow banking in China, but higher economic 
growth increases the size of shadow banking.  
The findings provide important policy implications to the Chinese government and regulatory 
authorities as follows: 1) the Chinese banks should further enhance the risk management practice, the 
reduction in the risk level will increase the competition in the loan market and further increase the 
size of shadow banking, this will provide more fundings to the small and medium sized enterprises; 
2) the government and financial regulatory authorities should consider to control the stock market 
development, because a lower level of stock market development will increase the competitive 
condition in the banking market and further increase the size of shadow baking, the expansion of 
shadow banking can further increase the funding channels for the small and medium sized enterprises; 
3) the government and financial regulatory authority should further consider to improve the banking 
sector development by encouraging more innovation in financial products, this will be also helpful 
for the shadow banking expansion.  
Future research can focus on the investigation of the inter-relationships between risk, performance, 
competition and shadow banking and also the data can be expanded to include a number of different 
countries in a region (Asia, North America, or Europe) to test whether the similar or different results 
will be obtained. 
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Table 1 Summary of the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking institutions in China over the period 2003-2017
• The data above is collected from CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission) annual reports, and the figures are in RMB 100 million.  





























































































276584 315990 374697 439500 531160 631515 795146 953053 1132873 1136224 1513547 1723355 1993454 2322532 2524040
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Figure 1 Competitive condition in different banking markets in China over 2003-2017








Boone indicator (loan market)
Boone indicator (deposit market)
Boone indicator (non-interest income market)
competition in the Chinese banking industry
• The graph is made of data from Bankscope and fitchconnect databases as well as own 
estimation.
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Table 2 Size and composition of China’s shadow banking during 2003-2017 (RMB 1 billion)
Total %GDP Domestic credit to private sector by banks over GDP (%)
2003 784 6 125.52
2004 1067 7 118.55
2005 1266 7 111.81
2006 2212 11 109.13
2007 3503 13 105.71
2008 4530 14 101.9
2009 5995 17 124.2
2010 11111 27 126.29
2011 14180 29 122.75
2012 19207 36 128.49
2013 24952 42 133.8
2014 29000 45 140.74
2015 32000 46 153.23
2016 44000 59 157.57
2017 48000 58 157.02
• The data is collected from Elliott et al. (2015), CNBC and Bloomberg
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Table 3 Summary statistics 






450 3.35 0.97 -0.79 6.86
Price of funds 




450 1.27 0.18 0.74 1.96
Price of capital 




450 1.92 0.26 0.68 2.83
Total loans 450 4.59 0.99 0.34 7.95
Securities 450 4.21 1.04 -0.41 7.87
Non-interest 
income
450 2.34 1.1 -2.4 5.81
Total deposits 450 4.85 0.98 0.66 8.26
Page 24 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem

































































Table 4 description of the variables in the current study, data source and expected impact 
Variables Measurement Data source Expected impact
Competition in the loan 
market
Boone indicator Bankscope and fitchconnect shadow banking (+)
Competition in the deposit 
market
Boone indicator Bankscope and fitchconnect shadow banking (+)
Competition in the non-
interest income market
Boone indicator Bankscope and fitchconnect Shadow banking (+)
Shadow banking Volume of shadow banking Eliott et al. (2015), CNBC 
and Bloomberg
competition in loan market 
(+)
competition in deposit 
market (+)




The ratio of total assets in 
the banking industry to 
GDP
CBRC competition in loan market 
(-)
competition in deposit 
market (+)
Stock market development The ratio of market 
capitalization of listed 
companies to GDP
World Bank competition in loan market 
(+)
competition in non-interest 
income market (+)
shadow banking (-)
Inflation Annual inflation rate World Bank
Competition in deposit 
market (-)
Shadow banking (-)
GDPG Annual GDP growth rate World Bank
Shadow banking (+)




Competition in the non-
interest income market (-)
Bank risk Ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans 
Bankscope and 
Fitchconnect
Competition in the loan 
market (-)
Bank diversification Ratio of non-interest 
income to gross revenue
Bankscope and 
Fitchconnect
Competition in the deposit 
market (-)
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Table 5 descriptive statistics of the variables
Variables observations Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
BooneLoan 450 -0.003 0.006 -0.02 0.002
BooneDeposit 450 -0.002 0.005 -0.015 0.002
BooneNII 450 -0.007 0.02 -0.05 0.004
Shadow banking 450 8073.364      7843.101        784    24952
Bank profitability 450 2.66 0.83 0.54 3.29
Bank risk 450 2.78 4.48 0 13.86
Bank 
diversification
450 13.98 13.31 -12.94 79.4
bank size  450 4.9 0.992 0.71 8.51
Banking sector 
development
450 2.22    0.24      1.98       2.66
Stock market 
development
450 71.19625    43.48973       31.9      184.1
inflation 450 2.859796    1.923602       -.77       5.86
GDP growth rate 450 10.19091    1.869885        7.7       14.2
• BooneLoan indicates the competitive condition in the loan market, BooneDeposit represents the 
competitive condition in the deposit market and BooneNII stands for the competitive condition in the 
non-interest income market. 
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Table 6 3SLS empirical results on the inter-relationships between competition and shadow banking (deposit market)
Equation 1: BooneLoan as 
the dependent variable
Equation 2: BooneDeposit 
as the dependent variable
Equation 3: BooneNII as 
the dependent variable
Equation 4: shadow 











































Chi 2 779.53*** 700.33*** 850.28*** 779.18***
Individual bank effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Time trend Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Notes: T-Statistics in ().
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*Statistical significance at 10%.
**Statistical significance at 5%.
***Statis ical significance at 1%
BooneLoan indicates the competitive condition in the loan market, BooneDeposit represents the competitive condition in the deposit market and 
BooneNII stands for the competitive condition in the non-interest income market. 
Table 7 3SLS empirical results on the inter-relationships between competition and shadow banking (loan market)
Equation 1: BooneLoan as 
the dependent variable
Equation 2: BooneDeposit 
as the dependent variable
Equation 3: BooneNII as 
the dependent variable
Equation 4: shadow 
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Chi 2 779.53*** 700.33*** 850.28*** 822.61***
Individual bank effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Time trend Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Notes: T-Statistics in ().
*Statistical significance at 10%.
**Statistical significance at 5%.
***Statistical significance at 1%
BooneLoan indicates the competitive condition in the loan market, BooneDeposit represents the competitive condition in the deposit market and 
BooneNII stands for the competitive condition in the non-interest income market. 
Table 8 3SLS empirical results on the inter-relationships between competition and shadow banking (non-interest income market)
Equation 1: BooneLoan as 
the dependent variable
Equation 2: BooneDeposit 
as the dependent variable
Equation 3: BooneNII as 
the dependent variable
Equation 4: shadow 
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Chi 2 779.53*** 700.33*** 850.28*** 843.23***
Individual bank effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Time trend Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Notes: T-Statistics in ().
*Statistical significance at 10%.
**Statistical significance at 5%.
***Statistical significance at 1%
BooneLoan indicates the competitive condition in the loan market, BooneDeposit represents the competitive condition in the deposit market and 
BooneNII stands for the competitive condition in the non-interest income market. 
Table 9 Summary of empirical results for the relationship between shadow banking and competition in different banking markets
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Significant and negative Significant and negative Significant and 
negative 
Inflation Significant and positive 




Significant and negative 
Bank risk Significant and negative 




Significant and negative 
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Competitions in different banking markets and shadow banking: evidence from 
China
Dear Editor
Hope you are very well. Thank you very much for the opportunity to revise the manuscript and we 
have carefully and thoroughly considered and addressed the comments from the three reviewers on 
a one-by-one basis. The manuscript benefited from the comments substantially and the clarity and 
quality of the manuscript have been significant improved.
Please see below the responses to the comments. 




1. In the introduction, we suggest that the author simplify the description of the background 
and make the introduction more logical.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The description of the background 
has been simplified and the now it has been more logical. 
The Chinese government has initiated several rounds of banking reforms since 1978. The main 
purpose of these banking reforms has been to increase competitive conditions, enhance stability 
and improve the performance of the Chinese banking sector (Tan, 2016a). With regards to the 
competitive condition in the Chinese banking industry, it is noticed that the state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs)1 still dominate the industry. However, according to statistics from 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the share of SOCB assets in total banking 
sector assets decreased between 2003 and 2017 to a low point of 36.77%. On the other hand, 
the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have kept 
increasing in size in a general trend and in 2017 they held 17.81% and 12.57% of total banking 
sector assets. Therefore, this statistic shows that the competitive condition is still quite low 
given that the five largest banks hold nearly 40% of total banking sector assets. Table 1 
1 There are five state-owned commercial banks in China now, including Bank of China, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of 
China and Bank of Communication. 
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summarises the assets of SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and total banking institutions in China over 
the period 2003-2017. 
<<Table 1---about here>>
The lower level of competition in the Chinese banking industry is not only represented by the 
concentration ratio in terms of total assets as illustrated before, this can also be reflected from 
different types of businesses engaged in by the Chinese commercial banks. In order to improve 
the competitive conditions in the deposit market and the loan market, the Central Bank of China 
(the Peoples’ Bank of China) had made efforts to liberalise the interest rate since 1996. From 
20th July 2013 and 23rd October 2015, the loan interest rate, as well as the deposit interest rate 
in China, had been liberalized. The effectiveness of interest rate liberalisation, in other words, 
the impact of interest rate liberalisation on the competitive conditions in the deposit market, 
the loan market, as well as the non-interest income market in China, has been a concern for the 
Chinese government and banking regulatory authorities in China. Recently, the issue has been 
investigated by Tan (2017). The results of the research show that over the period 2003-2013, 
the non-interest income market has a higher level of competition compared to the deposit 
market and loan market in the Chinese banking industry.
Although the financial reform in China, as characterised by the interest rate liberalisation, is 
supposed to increase the competitive conditions in different banking markets in China, because 
of the specific and special characteristics of the Chinese banking industry, the banking sector 
still allocates the credits (providing loan services) focusing on large or state-owned enterprises 
and the medium and small size enterprises find obtaining loans difficult, and thus, it is very 
difficult for them to be competitive and survive in the market (Elliott et al. (2015). This biased 
treatment to the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises has a significant and negative 
impact on Chinese economic growth. Most of the funds for small and medium-sized enterprises 
are from shadow banking2. Table 2 shows the size and composition of China’s shadow banking 
over the period 2003-2017 (Elliot et al., 2015, CNBC and Bloomberg). The table shows that 
the shadow banking is becoming more and more important in China. 
<<Table 2---about here>>
2 The Financial Stability Board (2013) defines shadow banking as credit intermediation involving entities and 
activities outside the regular banking system. 
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Although there are few pieces of research studies investigating the relationship between 
shadow banking and interest rate liberalization in China (Wang et al., 2016; Hu, 2014), there 
is no study examining the inter-relationship between shadow banking and competition in 
different banking markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market) in 
China. Investigating this issue is very important from two different perspectives. First, the 
examination on the impact of competition in three different markets on shadow banking will 
provide more policy implications to the Chinese government and financial authorities in related 
to how to further solve the issue of difficulty for the small and medium sized enterprises to get 
funding, i.e. through further regulation on the environment for traditional banking businesses 
and non-traditional activities engaged in by the banks, the resulted influence on the growth of 
shadow banking can further increase the funding channels for the small and medium sized 
enterprises. Second, the investigation on the influence of shadow banking on competition in 
different banking markets can provide additional channel to adjust the level of competition in 
the banking market through better and proper regulation on the non-banking financial market. 
On the one hand, the increase in the size of shadow banking takes away large amounts of loan 
businesses engaged in by the Chinese commercial banks, as the main source of bank income, 
this will increase the competition among Chinese commercial banks in the loan business. In 
addition, stronger competition in the loan market indicates that it is more difficult for the banks 
to grant credits to businesses. In order words, the volume of loan businesses engaged in by the 
Chinese commercial banks will be decreased, this further leads to a decline in the level of 
competition in the deposit market. Finally, a large amount of shadow banking not only takes 
away the loan business from commercial banks, but takes away the non-interest income 
generating business as well, this will lead to an increase in the level of competition among 
Chinese commercial banks in the non-interest income market. 
On the other hand, lower level of competition in the loan market in the Chinese banking 
industry indicates that a large number of firms need the loans, this gives a big opportunity for 
the development of shadow banking in China. In other words, lower level of competition in the 
loan market leads to an increase in the size of shadow banking in China. In addition, increase 
in the level of competition in the deposit market in the Chinese banking industry reflects the 
fact that the Chinese commercial banks are short of funds to make loans, this will further lead 
to an expansion of shadow banking in China. Finally, lower level of competition in the non-
interest income market in the Chinese banking industry indicates that Chinese commercial 
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banks still focus on providing loan services to different enterprises, this is supposed to restrain 
the development of shadow banking in China. 
In summary, the current study fills the gaps in the empirical literature in the following three 
ways: 1) as the literature review section indicates, we will contribute to the existing studies by 
investigating the inter-relationships between competition in different banking markets and 
bank competition, this will be useful for the Chinese government and financial regulatory 
authority to regulate the shadow banking system through making relevant policies in the 
banking industry and also regulate the competition in different banking markets through 
making relevant policies to control the size of shadow banking；2) as far as we are concerned, 
there has been no published empirical study examining the determinants of competition in 
different banking markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market); we 
will investigate this issue in the current study; 3) besides the examination on the impact of 
competition on shadow banking as reflected from the first contribution, we will also investigate 
the factors that influence the size of shadow banking system in China. The latter two 
contributions are very useful for the government and financial regulatory authority to make 
specific policies to regulate either bank competition or/and shadow banking in China.
The findings show that an increase in the volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in the 
competitive condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market, while 
the increase in the level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest 
income market leads to an increase in the volume of shadow banking in China. We find that 
higher bank risk and higher developed of stock market reduce the competitive condition in the 
loan market, the competition in the deposit market will be enhanced by higher levels of banking 
sector development and higher levels of inflation, but bank diversification will reduce the level 
of competition in the deposit market. We further find that higher bank profitability and higher 
stock market development reduce bank competition in the non-interest income market. Finally, 
the results show that larger bank size and higher development of stock market reduce the size 
of shadow banking in China, but higher economic growth increases the size of shadow banking.  
This paper will be structured as follows: section 2 will review the empirical literature on bank 
competition, shadow banking and its relationships, which is followed by section 3, describing 
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the data and methods. Section 4 reports the results, followed by discussing the robustness check 
in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides a summary and conclusion of the whole paper. 
2. The motivation of investigating the inter-relationships between competitions in different 
banking markets (deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market) and 
shadow banking is not explained clearly. The introduction carefully reveals some research 
and the analysis.  However, there is little discussion of why we study this issue and 
investigate Chinese banking industry from three aspects (deposit market, loan market and 
non-interest income market).
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. More discussions have been 
provided as why we study this issue and investigate Chinese banking industry from three aspects. 
Although there are few pieces of research studies investigating the relationship between 
shadow banking and interest rate liberalization in China (Wang et al., 2016; Hu, 2014), there 
is no study examining the inter-relationship between shadow banking and competition in 
different banking markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market) in 
China. Investigating this issue is very important from two different perspectives. First, the 
examination on the impact of competition in three different markets on shadow banking will 
provide more policy implications to the Chinese government and financial authorities in related 
to how to further solve the issue of difficulty for the small and medium sized enterprises to get 
funding, i.e. through further regulation on the environment for traditional banking businesses 
and non-traditional activities engaged in by the banks, the resulted influence on the growth of 
shadow banking can further increase the funding channels for the small and medium sized 
enterprises. Second, the investigation on the influence of shadow banking on competition in 
different banking markets can provide additional channel to adjust the level of competition in 
the banking market through better and proper regulation on the non-banking financial market.
3. We suggest to sort out papers in the literature review section to make it logical instead of 
simply classifying and reviewing them.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for the comment. The literature review section has 
been re-drafted.
There are a number of studies investigating the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking 
industry using different methods including Lerner index (Tan and Floros, 2013; Tan and Floros, 
2014; Tan, 2016a; Tan et al., 2017; Tan and Anchor, 2017b; Tan and Floros, 2018a; Fungacova 
et al., 2013); Panzar-Rosse H statistic (Tan, 2014; Tan, 2016b); Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (Tan and Anchor, 2017a; Tan and Floros, 2018b), concentration ratio and Hirfindahl-
Hirschmann index (Tan and Floros, 2012b, Tan and Floros, 2012c; Tan, 2016, Tan, 2014)
Although the above-mentioned studies use different methods to estimate the level of 
competition in the Chinese banking industry, none of the above-mentioned methods evaluates 
the competitive conditions in different banking markets in China.
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Tan (2017a) innovatively uses the Boone indicator to investigate the competitive conditions of 
different banking markets (deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market) in 
China over the period 2003-2009 and further tests the effects of competition and shadow 
banking on bank profitability in China. The results indicate that non-interest income market in 
the Chinese banking industry has a higher level of competition compared to deposit market and 
loan market, and a lower level of competition in the deposit market leads to an increase in the 
profitability of Chinese banks. 
Using the Boone indicator as the competition measurement, Tan (2017b) investigate the 
competitive condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market in the 
Chinese banking industry over the period 2003-2013 and further tests its inter-relationships 
with different types of risk (credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and insolvency) and different 
types of efficiency (cost efficiency, revenue efficiency and profit efficiency) of Chinese 
commercial banks under a three-stage least square estimation. The results indicate that higher 
level of competition leads to higher credit risk, higher liquidity risk and higher capital risk, 
while a higher level of competition leads to lower level of efficiency of Chinese commercial 
banks. 
2.2 Literature review on shadow banking in China
Although data on shadow banking in China is available, the research in this topic has not 
received enough attention from academia and there are very limited research studies examining 
this important issue. Allen et al. (2019) collected the data from all public nonfinancial firms’ 
annual reports over the period 2004-2013 and had a close look at the largest component of 
shadow banking in China, which is entrusted loans. The performance of transaction level 
analysis shows that the level of interest rate charged by nonaffiliated loans is twice as high as 
the one offered by the official bank loan rate, while the level of interest rate charged by the 
affiliated loans is roughly the same as the one of the official bank loan rate. The findings further 
show that there is a level of difference between the nonaffiliated loans and the affiliated loans 
with nearly half of the former flow into real estate and construction and the latter are within-
industry loans. Finally, the results report that although borrowers’ fundamental and information 
risks are the determinants of pricing of both these two types of loans, the risk is incorporated 
in the rate of nonaffiliated loans in a more efficient way.
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Rather than looking at the specific component of Chinese shadow banking, Chen et al. (2018) 
examine the influence of monetary policy on Chinese shadow banking activities over the period 
2009-2015. The study contributes to the empirical literature by developing and estimating the 
endogenously switching monetary policy rule and the findings suggest that the shadow banking 
loans rise rapidly under the contractionary monetary policy, this increased in the volumes of 
shadow banking loans does not only offset the expected decline of the traditional banking loans, 
but reduce the level of effectiveness of monetary policy on banking credit allocation.
Different from the above two studies investigate the specific component of shadow banking 
and the relationship between monetary policy and shadow banking, Chen et al. (2020) 
investigate the impact of China’s stimulus package in 2009 on the growth of shadow banking. 
Therefore, this study differentiates itself from the previous two studies by analyzing the 
influence on the shadow banking activities from the local government perspectives. The 
findings suggest that the provinces with higher degrees of loan growth in 2009 not only 
experience an increase in the volumes of municipal bond issuance over the period 2012-2015, 
but also experience a boom in the level of shadow banking activities including trust loans and 
wealth management products. 
2.3. the investigation on the relationship between shadow banking and bank competition
There are few pieces of research examining the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition. The studies focused on the issue both within the Chinese financial system as well 
as the one outside of China. Using the US data, Ann and Breton (2014) examine the impact of 
loan securitization on competition in the loan market.  This study suffers from the limitation 
that the shadow banking is represented by the securitization and the results can not be 
generalized to the whole shadow banking markets, another limitation of the study lies to the 
fact that there is no explicity consideration on the level of competition in different banking 
markets. 
There are also few studies evaluating the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition in China. On top of Tan (2017) examining the shadow banking as well as its impact 
on bank profitability, Guo and Zhao (2017) used 16 Chinese commercial banks during 2008-
2015 to assess the relationship between deposit competition and shadow banking. The study 
failed to identify the level of competition in another two important areas in banking operation 
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which are competition in the loan market as well as competition in the non-interest income 
market, therefore, the study also missed the investigation on the inter-relationship between the 
competition in these different banking markets and bank competition. 
Instead of investigating the relationship between shadowing banking and deposit competition 
with a additional analysis of the intermediate role played by shadow banking in the influence 
of bank competition on risk-taking behavior, Zhou (2019) examined the relationship between 
bank competition and shadow banking using a sample of listed Chinese commercial banks over 
the period 2007-2017. The study further evaluate the effect of shadow banking on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. This study suffers the same limitation as the one of Guo and 
Zhao (2017). 
In summary, through the review of empirical literature on investigating the competitive 
condition in the banking sector in China as well as the empirical research studies on the 
investigation of shadow banking in China, it is noticed that there is no empirical research 
examining the relationship between bank competition and shadow banking. The current 
research fills in the gap of the empirical literature from this perspective. In addition, this will 
be the first piece of research examining the determinants of competition in different banking 
markets and also the factors influencing the size of shadowing banking in China.
4.  In the literature review, the author does not highlight the research significance of this 
paper on the basis of reviewing the existing literature and we suggests the author to 
supplement it.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The research significance has 
been provided by the end of the literature review section.
In summary, through the review of empirical literature on investigating the competitive 
condition in the banking sector in China as well as the empirical research studies on the 
investigation of shadow banking in China, it is noticed that there is no empirical research 
examining the relationship between bank competition and shadow banking. The current 
research fills in the gap of the empirical literature from this perspective. In addition, this will 
be the first piece of research examining the determinants of competition in different banking 
markets and also the factors influencing the size of shadowing banking in China.
5. When we select variables for empirical analysis(like equation(6)), is there any literature 
support or theoretical basis?
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. We have addressed this issue.
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The selection of the variables that have potential influence on the level of competition in 
different banking markets is in line with Tan (2017b). with regard to the selection of the 
controlled variables that have potential influence on shadow banking, we mainly have the 
following considerations: higher levels of stock market development will provide an additional 
channel for the small and medium sized enterprises to raise funding besides the traditional 
banking loans, this will also crowd out the role of shadow banking in the process of credit 
allocation and further reduce the size of shadow banking. In terms of inflation, we argue that 
higher levels of inflation result in a contraction of credits, this will include the traditional 
banking credits as well as the one provided in the shadow banking sector. 
6. In the second paragraph of section 6(Summary and conclusion),we recommend making 
recommendations based on the findings of this paper rather than citing others’.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. We have re-written this 
part. 
The findings provide important policy implications to the Chinese government and regulatory 
authorities as follows: 1) the Chinese banks should further enhance the risk management 
practice, the reduction in the risk level will increase the competition in the loan market and 
further increase the size of shadow banking, this will provide more fundings to the small and 
medium sized enterprises; 2) the government and financial regulatory authorities should 
consider to control the stock market development, because a lower level of stock market 
development will increase the competitive condition in the banking market and further increase 
the size of shadow baking, the expansion of shadow banking can further increase the funding 
channels for the small and medium sized enterprises; 3) the government and financial 
regulatory authority should further consider to improve the banking sector development by 
encouraging more innovation in financial products, this will be also helpful for the shadow 
banking expansion.  
7. Some words are misspelled like “Equeation” in Table 8; “ BooneNII as the deposit variable” in 
Table 6 & Table 7 &Table 8
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. This has been corrected. 
Reviewer 2:
1. The topic of this paper is not new. Overseas (such as Ahn and Breton, 2014) and domestic (such 
as Guo and Zhao, 2017; Zhou, 2019, Tan, 2017) all have relevant research to analyze the relationship 
between competition and shadow banking. It is necessary to elaborate the research cha acteristics 
of this paper, the differences between the previous research and the new contributions.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. These suggested citations have 
been provided in the literature review section and the research contributions have been 
summarized. Please see section 2.3 for detail. 
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2.3. the investigation on the relationship between shadow banking and bank competition
There are few pieces of research examining the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition. The studies focused on the issue both within the Chinese financial system as well 
as the one outside of China. Using the US data, Ann and Breton (2014) examine the impact of 
loan securitization on competition in the loan market.  This study suffers from the limitation 
that the shadow banking is represented by the securitization and the results can not be 
generalized to the whole shadow banking markets, another limitation of the study lies to the 
fact that there is no explicity consideration on the level of competition in different banking 
markets. 
There are also few studies evaluating the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition in China. On top of Tan (2017) examining the shadow banking as well as its impact 
on bank profitability, Guo and Zhao (2017) used 16 Chinese commercial banks during 2008-
2015 to assess the relationship between deposit competition and shadow banking. The study 
failed to identify the level of competition in another two important areas in banking operation 
which are competition in the loan market as well as competition in the non-interest income 
market, therefore, the study also missed the investigation on the inter-relationship between the 
competition in these different banking markets and bank competition. 
Instead of investigating the relationship between shadowing banking and deposit competition 
with a additional analysis of the intermediate role played by shadow banking in the influence 
of bank competition on risk-taking behavior, Zhou (2019) examined the relationship between 
bank competition and shadow banking using a sample of listed Chinese commercial banks over 
the period 2007-2017. The study further evaluate the effect of shadow banking on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. This study suffers the same limitation as the one of Guo and 
Zhao (2017). 
In summary, through the review of empirical literature on investigating the competitive 
condition in the banking sector in China as well as the empirical research studies on the 
investigation of shadow banking in China, it is noticed that there is no empirical research 
examining the relationship between bank competition and shadow banking. The current 
research fills in the gap of the empirical literature from this perspective. In addition, this will 
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be the first piece of research examining the determinants of competition in different banking 
markets and also the factors influencing the size of shadowing banking in China.
2. Research contribution needs to be refined: the first point is that there are relevant researches on 
research contribution, and it is necessary to explain the innovation compared with it; The second 
point is that shadow banking influences the competition of various markets of banks in the research 
contribution? The third point is not different from the first point.
Response to this comment: thank you very much for this comment. The research contributions in 
the introduction have been refined. 
In summary, the current study fills the gaps in the empirical literature in the following three 
ways: 1) as the literature review section indicates, we will contribute to the existing studies by 
investigating the inter-relationships between competition in different banking markets and 
bank competition, this will be useful for the Chinese government and financial regulatory 
authority to regulate the shadow banking system through making relevant policies in the 
banking industry and also regulate the competition in different banking markets through 
making relevant policies to control the size of shadow banking；2) as far as we are concerned, 
there has been no published empirical study examining the determinants of competition in 
different banking markets (loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market); we 
will investigate this issue in the current study; 3) besides the examination on the impact of 
competition on shadow banking as reflected from the first contribution, we will also investigate 
the factors that influence the size of shadow banking system in China. The latter two 
contributions are very useful for the government and financial regulatory authority to make 
specific policies to regulate either bank competition or/and shadow banking in China.
3. In the literature review section 2.2.Empirical Literature on bank competition in China is simple 
stacking, which requires comprehensive analysis and summary.
Response to the comment: thank you very much for this comment. The literature review section 
has been drafted.
There are a number of studies investigating the competitive conditions in the Chinese banking 
industry using different methods including Lerner index (Tan and Floros, 2013; Tan and Floros, 
2014; Tan, 2016a; Tan et al., 2017; Tan and Anchor, 2017b; Tan and Floros, 2018a; Fungacova 
et al., 2013); Panzar-Rosse H statistic (Tan, 2014; Tan, 2016b); Efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (Tan and Anchor, 2017a; Tan and Floros, 2018b), concentration ratio and Hirfindahl-
Hirschmann index (Tan and Floros, 2012b, Tan and Floros, 2012c; Tan, 2016, Tan, 2014)
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Although the above-mentioned studies use different methods to estimate the level of 
competition in the Chinese banking industry, none of the above-mentioned methods evaluates 
the competitive conditions in different banking markets in China.
Tan (2017a) innovatively uses the Boone indicator to investigate the competitive conditions of 
different banking markets (deposit market, loan market and non-interest income market) in 
China over the period 2003-2009 and further tests the effects of competition and shadow 
banking on bank profitability in China. The results indicate that non-interest income market in 
the Chinese banking industry has a higher level of competition compared to deposit market and 
loan market, and a lower level of competition in the deposit market leads to an increase in the 
profitability of Chinese banks. 
Using the Boone indicator as the competition measurement, Tan (2017b) investigate the 
competitive condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market in the 
Chinese banking industry over the period 2003-2013 and further tests its inter-relationships 
with different types of risk (credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and insolvency) and different 
types of efficiency (cost efficiency, revenue efficiency and profit efficiency) of Chinese 
commercial banks under a three-stage least square estimation. The results indicate that higher 
level of competition leads to higher credit risk, higher liquidity risk and higher capital risk, 
while a higher level of competition leads to lower level of efficiency of Chinese commercial 
banks. 
2.2 Literature review on shadow banking in China
Although data on shadow banking in China is available, the research in this topic has not 
received enough attention from academia and there are very limited research studies examining 
this important issue. Allen et al. (2019) collected the data from all public nonfinancial firms’ 
annual reports over the period 2004-2013 and had a close look at the largest component of 
shadow banking in China, which is entrusted loans. The performance of transaction level 
analysis shows that the level of interest rate charged by nonaffiliated loans is twice as high as 
the one offered by the official bank loan rate, while the level of interest rate charged by the 
affiliated loans is roughly the same as the one of the official bank loan rate. The findings further 
show that there is a level of difference between the nonaffiliated loans and the affiliated loans 
with nearly half of the former flow into real estate and construction and the latter are within-
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industry loans. Finally, the results report that although borrowers’ fundamental and information 
risks are the determinants of pricing of both these two types of loans, the risk is incorporated 
in the rate of nonaffiliated loans in a more efficient way.
Rather than looking at the specific component of Chinese shadow banking, Chen et al. (2018) 
examine the influence of monetary policy on Chinese shadow banking activities over the period 
2009-2015. The study contributes to the empirical literature by developing and estimating the 
endogenously switching monetary policy rule and the findings suggest that the shadow banking 
loans rise rapidly under the contractionary monetary policy, this increased in the volumes of 
shadow banking loans does not only offset the expected decline of the traditional banking loans, 
but reduce the level of effectiveness of monetary policy on banking credit allocation.
Different from the above two studies investigate the specific component of shadow banking 
and the relationship between monetary policy and shadow banking, Chen et al. (2020) 
investigate the impact of China’s stimulus package in 2009 on the growth of shadow banking. 
Therefore, this study differentiates itself from the previous two studies by analyzing the 
influence on the shadow banking activities from the local government perspectives. The 
findings suggest that the provinces with higher degrees of loan growth in 2009 not only 
experience an increase in the volumes of municipal bond issuance over the period 2012-2015, 
but also experience a boom in the level of shadow banking activities including trust loans and 
wealth management products. 
2.3. the investigation on the relationship between shadow banking and bank competition
There are few pieces of research examining the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition. The studies focused on the issue both within the Chinese financial system as well 
as the one outside of China. Using the US data, Ann and Breton (2014) examine the impact of 
loan securitization on competition in the loan market.  This study suffers from the limitation 
that the shadow banking is represented by the securitization and the results cannot be 
generalized to the whole shadow banking markets, another limitation of the study lies to the 
fact that there is no explicit consideration on the level of competition in different banking 
markets. 
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There are also few studies evaluating the relationship between shadow banking and bank 
competition in China. On top of Tan (2017) examining the shadow banking as well as its impact 
on bank profitability, Guo and Zhao (2017) used 16 Chinese commercial banks during 2008-
2015 to assess the relationship between deposit competition and shadow banking. The study 
failed to identify the level of competition in another two important areas in banking operation 
which are competition in the loan market as well as competition in the non-interest income 
market, therefore, the study also missed the investigation on the inter-relationship between the 
competition in these different banking markets and bank competition. 
Instead of investigating the relationship between shadowing banking and deposit competition 
with a additional analysis of the intermediate role played by shadow banking in the influence 
of bank competition on risk-taking behavior, Zhou (2019) examined the relationship between 
bank competition and shadow banking using a sample of listed Chinese commercial banks over 
the period 2007-2017. The study further evaluates the effect of shadow banking on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. This study suffers the same limitation as the one of Guo and 
Zhao (2017). 
In summary, through the review of empirical literature on investigating the competitive 
condition in the banking sector in China as well as the empirical research studies on the 
investigation of shadow banking in China, it is noticed that there is no empirical research 
examining the relationship between bank competition and shadow banking. The current 
research fills in the gap of the empirical literature from this perspective. In addition, this will 
be the first piece of research examining the determinants of competition in different banking 
markets and also the factors influencing the size of shadowing banking in China.
4. There are Lerner Index, H statistic, Boone index, HHI index and so on. In this paper, Boone index 
is selected directly. Why do we use this index? What are the advantages compared with other 
indexes?
Response to the comment: thank you very much for this comment. This issue has been addressed 
in section 3.1
As reviewed in the literature review section, Lerner index and Panzar Rosse H statistics are 
widely used in the empirical literature to estimate the level of competition in the banking 
industry. However, Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) argue that due to the fact that the Panzar-Rosse 
H statistics are developed based on the static model, there would be no prediction on the value 
and this indicator suffers from the limitation that it can not fulfil the overall market equilibrium 
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requirement (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). The Lerner index is suffered from the limitation in 
terms of the difficulty to derive the marginal cost, because of different methods can be adopted 
to measure the marginal cost, therefore, the accuracy and robustness in related to the level of 
competition are affected (Fukuyama and Tan, 2020). Kwoka (1977) argue that the main 
limitation suffered by the Hirfindahl-Hirschman index is related to the fact that this indicator 
embodies both size inequality and firm numbers with weight, which are assumed a priori 
instead of being derived. Finally, Maksimović & Kostić (2012) argue that the concentration 
ratio suffers from the limitation of its inability to acknowledge market structure stability, level 
of product differentiation, entry barriers as well as operating cost.
Although this indicator suffers from the same disadvantage as the Lerner index in terms of the 
estimation of marginal cost, this indicator is superior to other indicators for its ability to 
estimate competition in different banking markets and competition for different bank 
ownership types (Tan, 2018). 
5. The model has a serious problem of reciprocal causality. How to choose tools and how is the 
effectiveness of tool variables? 
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The model has been 
reconsidered and new models have been provided in the revised manuscript with relevant 
discussions on this issue. Please see section 3.2 for detail. 
             (6)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
             (7)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡
                           (8)𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
+                               (9) itt Booneshadow 10  itSMD2 𝛾3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
We control for different bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables 
which are supposed to have an influence on bank competition and shadow banking in China. 
The bank specific variables include bank profitability, measured by the net interest margin 
(ratio of net interest income to earning assets); bank risk, measured by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, bank diversification, measured by the ratio of non-interest 
income to gross revenue and bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.  
In order to use the three-stage least square estimator in the analysis, a set of unique variables 
are needed for a specific equation but not the other three. These instruments are supposed to 
be exogenous and do not correlate with the error term. We expect that the following variables 
only affect specific dependent variables, therefore, they only appear in one specific equation 
but not the other three.
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Bank risk is used in this equation, it is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans. We expect that higher levels of credit risk will induce the banks to be more cautions 
in making the credit allocation decisions, they will be more selective and raising the 
requirement on the loan applications made by different businesses, comparing to the scenario 
when there is a very low level of credit risk during which the banks would compete very 
strongly in the loan market, the higher levels of risk will reduce the level of competition in 
the loan market. 
Equation 7 only
Bank diversification is used in this equation, it is measured by the ratio of non-interest 
income to gross revenue. We argue that higher levels of diversification will reduce the 
reliance on the traditional deposit and loan businesses engaged in by the banks, more 
resources and efforts will be diverted to other businesses, this is supposed to reduce the level 
of competition in the deposit market.
Equation 8 only
Bank profitability is used in this equation. It is measured by the net interest margin (the ratio 
of net interest income to earning assets). The whole banking business can be generally 
divided into two parts, the traditional interest generating businesses as well as the non-
traditional non-interest generating activities. Bank profitability, as measured by the net 
interest margin, reflect the level of profitability in the traditional interest generating 
businesses, a higher level of profitability indicates that banks would be able to get more 
profits from engaging in this specific activity, more resources will be allocated to this 
business area and this is supposed to lead to a decrease in the level of competition in the non-
traditional non-interest generating businesses.
Equation 9 only
Bank size is used in this equation. It is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Large banks would be able to reduce the costs from economies of scale and economies of 
scope, the reduction would be helpful to reduce the level of loan price. In other words, lower 
levels of cost derived from economies of scale and scope would expand the credits available 
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from the traditional banking, this will also constraint the amount of credits from the shadow 
banking sector. 
We conduct the over-identification test and the test statistics show that the instruments used 
are valid. 
6. There are too few control variables, and the individual characteristics of the bank, such as asset 
size, profitability, risk status and other indicators, should be controlled at least.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. This issue has been addressed 
in the previous point. 
7. Does shadow banking have economic significance because it has a little impact on the 
competition of loan, deposit and non interest market?
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The new updated results show 
that shadow banking has a significant impact on the competition in the loan, deposit and non-
interest income market. Please see tables, 6, 7 and 8 for detail.
8. There are great differences in scale, profit and other aspects between individual banks, and 
some individual characteristics of banks cannot be observed, so it is necessary to control the 
individual effect of banks.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The updated results in tables 
6, 7 and 8 have controlled for the individual effect. 
9. From Figure 1, it can be seen that there is a sudden change in market competition in 2013, and 
then there is a trend of gradual increase. Does the results observed in this paper have the 
influence of time trend? In this paper, we need to further investigate the market mutation in 2013, 
and add time effect variables into the model.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The updated results in tables 
6, 7 and 8 have controlled for the individual effect. 
10. The results in the regression table need to be adjusted by standard error (cluster).
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. 
In order to test the inter-relationships between competition in different banking markets and 
shadow banking in an accurate way, we control for the individual bank effect as well as the time 
trend in the models. Most importantly, the results reported are adjusted by standard errors. 
Reviewer 3
1. The introduction is clear, the authors discuss the significant and importance of the research 
topic with contributions and results outlined, while I know that the key theme of the research is to 
examine the relationships between bank competition and shadow banking, while in the 
contributions, the authors clearly stated that two of the contributions are: 1) investigate the 
determinants of competition in different markets; 2) examine the factors of shadow banking size 
in China. And both of these two contributions have been shown in the modelling framework, I did 
not see that in the introduction, when the authors briefly outline the results, any findings are 
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reported about this. In other words, when the authors outline the results, they need to be in line 
with the contributions.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. The results have been 
provided in the introduction.
The findings show that an increase in the volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in the 
competitive condition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market, while 
the increase in the level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest 
income market leads to an increase in the volume of shadow banking in China. We find that 
higher bank risk and higher developed of stock market reduce the competitive condition in the 
loan market, the competition in the deposit market will be enhanced by higher levels of banking 
sector development and higher levels of inflation, but bank diversification will reduce the level 
of competition in the deposit market. We further find that higher bank profitability and higher 
stock market development reduce bank competition in the non-interest income market. Finally, 
the results show that larger bank size and higher development of stock market reduce the size 
of shadow banking in China, but higher economic growth increases the size of shadow banking.  
2. Literature review- this section is clear, I have had a search on the empirical literature, there are 
quite a few papers published during recent couple of years dealing with the issues of shadow 
banking in China, I recommend that the authors should cite these publications below in the paper:
1)Allen, F., Qian, Y., Tu, G., and Yu, F. (2019). Entrusted loans: a close look at China’s shadow 
banking system. Journal of Financial Economics, 133, 18-41.
2) Chen, Z., He, Z., and Liu, C. (2020). The Financing of local government in China: Stimulus loan 
wanes and shadow banking waxes
3) Chen, K., Ren, J., and Jia, T. (2018). Th nexus of monetary policy and shadow banking in China. 
American Economic Review, 108, 3891-3936.
Response to the comment: Thank you very much for this comment. All these recommended papers 
have been cited in the revised manuscript. Please see section 2.2 for detail.
Although data on shadow banking in China is available, the research in this topic has not 
received enough attention from academia and there are very limited research studies examining 
this important issue. Allen et al. (2019) collected the data from all public nonfinancial firms’ 
annual reports over the period 2004-2013 and had a close look at the largest component of 
shadow banking in China, which is entrusted loans. The performance of transaction level 
analysis shows that the level of interest rate charged by nonaffiliated loans is twice as high as 
the one offered by the official bank loan rate, while the level of interest rate charged by the 
affiliated loans is roughly the same as the one of the official bank loan rate. The findings further 
show that there is a level of difference between the nonaffiliated loans and the affiliated loans 
with nearly half of the former flow into real estate and construction and the latter are within-
industry loans. Finally, the results report that although borrowers’ fundamental and information 
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risks are the determinants of pricing of both these two types of loans, the risk is incorporated 
in the rate of nonaffiliated loans in a more efficient way.
Rather than looking at the specific component of Chinese shadow banking, Chen et al. (2018) 
examine the influence of monetary policy on Chinese shadow banking activities over the period 
2009-2015. The study contributes to the empirical literature by developing and estimating the 
endogenously switching monetary policy rule and the findings suggest that the shadow banking 
loans rise rapidly under the contractionary monetary policy, this increased in the volumes of 
shadow banking loans does not only offset the expected decline of the traditional banking loans, 
but reduce the level of effectiveness of monetary policy on banking credit allocation.
Different from the above two studies investigate the specific component of shadow banking 
and the relationship between monetary policy and shadow banking, Chen et al. (2020) 
investigate the impact of China’s stimulus package in 2009 on the growth of shadow banking. 
Therefore, this study differentiates itself from the previous two studies by analyzing the 
influence on the shadow banking activities from the local government perspectives. The 
findings suggest that the provinces with higher degrees of loan growth in 2009 not only 
experience an increase in the volumes of municipal bond issuance over the period 2012-2015, 
but also experience a boom in the level of shadow banking activities including trust loans and 
wealth management products. 
3. in the methodology section, the author should clearly talk about among 30 banks in the sample, 
what are the ownership types included?
Response to the comment: thank you very much for this comment. This has been clarified in the 
revised manuscript. 
Totally, we collect a balanced dataset of 30 Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003-
2017 including 5 state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 13 
city commercial banks.
4. in terms of the results section, the authors argue that in terms of the competition in different 
banking markets, the findings are in line with Tan (2017), however, Tan (2017) investigated the 
period of 2003-2013, the current paper uses 2003-2017, this is not an exact comparison. If the 
authors think that some of the findings are similar between the studies, the authors should claim 
partly in line with…..
Also it is recommended that the authors can provide a table summarizing the relationship 
between bank competition in different banking markets and shadow banking, as well as the 
determinants of bank competition and influencing factors of shadow banking.
Response to the comment: thank you very much for this comment. This issue has been addressed in 
the revised manuscript. 
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This finding is partly in line with Tan (2017).
Table 9 Summary of empirical results for the relationship between shadow banking and 













































Inflation Significant and 
positive 






Bank risk Significant and 
negative 






5. in the summary and conclusion, the authors are expected to summarize the results related to 
the determinants of bank competition and the influencing factors of shadow banking.
Response to the comment: thank you very much for this comment. The summary is provided in the 
section in the revised manuscript. 
The findings suggest that larger volume of shadow banking leads to a decline in competition 
in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income market. The results further show 
that higher level of competition in the loan market, deposit market and non-interest income 
market results in an increase in the volume of shadow banking in China. We find that higher 
bank risk and higher developed of stock market reduce the competitive condition in the loan 
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market,  while the competition in the deposit market will be enhanced by higher levels of 
banking sector development and higher levels of inflation, but bank diversification will reduce 
the level of competition in the deposit market. We further find that higher bank profitability 
and higher stock market development reduce bank competition in the non-interest income 
market. Finally, the results show that larger bank size and higher development of stock market 
reduce the size of shadow banking in China, but higher economic growth increases the size of 
shadow banking.  
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